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The topic for this year's annual meeting Symposium, "The Third Restatement of
Conflict of Laws," poses at least two basic questions: First is it time for a third
conflicts restatement; and, second if it is, what should that third restatement look like?
There has already been some enlightened speculation on the question of timing. Two
years ago at this meeting, when the topic was the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws' ("Second Restatement") on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversary,
Dean Symeonides noted that the Restatement of the Law of Conflict ofLaws ("First
Restatement"), published in 1934, was only nineteen years old when the ALI began
work on its successor.2 Now that successor is nearly thirty years old, so, purely as a
chronological matter, it does not seem to be too early to begin.
Further, the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the SecondRestatement also
suggest that early reconsideration is not unwarranted. It was clearly a transitional
work. The battle over choice-of-law theory was just beginning at the start of the
project, and in full force at the time of its completion. Attempting to "restate" the law
of choice oflaw in 1971 was analogous to trying to write a history of World War II
during the Battle of Stalingrad. Considering that drafting history, it is not surprising
that the Second Restatement began as one sort of work and ended as another.
Originally intended as a descriptive work, and only an incremental departure from its
t From the Greek, meaning "before word" and thus just a fancy form for the English
"prologue." We use the term to atone for past sins of omission, since we have never used (in
print) the words epistemic, semiotic, deontological, heuristic, exegetical, hermeneutic, or
hegemonic. Our other motive is that it allows us to share a fascinating piece of etymology
uncovered during research for this piece. The word in the title must be distinguished from the
similar-sounding "prolegumenon." Again from the Greek and sharing the prefix, its root
"legum" is entirely different. It denotes a genus of plants whose fleshy, starchy seedpods were
in classical times, as well as today, an important source of dietary protein. Thus the compound
word translates literally to "before the beans." Used in approbation to mean an unmannered,
unstilted discussion, it initially referred to the early part of a symposium, which occurred
before the main meal, after which the discussion became less fresh.
* Distinguished University Professor, University of Toledo, College of Law.
** Jacob A. France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971) [hereinafter SECOND
RESTATEMENT].
2. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) [hereinafter FIRST
RESTATEMENT]; see Symeon C. Symeonides, The JudicialAcceptance ofthe Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1281 (1997).
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predecessor, it ended as a radically different normative document designed to
incorporate the insights of and paper over the differences between the judicial and
academic choice-of-law revolutionaries?
Perhaps the best way to attack the timing problem is by reference to the second
question, the likely content of a third restatement. The proper time for a third
restatement is when societal conditions and/or conflicts thinking have changed
enough to make a reformulation both possible and fruitful. If the American Law
Institute ("ALl") were to undertake the project now, what sort of result should it try
to produce?
I. SOME QUICK THOUGHTS NOT ABOUT CHOICE OF LAW
Probably, Chapters 3 and 4, Judicial Jurisdiction, would profit from some
reexamination. The sections on jurisdiction received some attention in 1986 in light
of the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner4 and the promulgation of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments,' but more revisions are warranted to take account of the
Supreme Court's recent fascination with the topic. 6 It might be useful, for instance,
to devote special attention to the operation of the due process limits with respect to
alien defendants and to the increasingly important and complex law of forum non
conveniens and venue transfer.7
Finally it is clear that some retooling is needed to accommodate the increasing
amount of communication and commerce conducted electronically over the Internet.
At the end of the century, that development poses as great a challenge to the regime
of International Shoe' as nationwide commerce and the automobile did to Pennoyer
v. Neff' at its beginning. A medium that creates a whole new form of "space" is
bound to unsettle any jurisdictional regime that still depends in part on territorialism.
The Chapter on Judgments also should receive some attention in light of the
Supreme Court's renewed interest in the subject. After two hundred years offull faith
3. Thus one commentator remarked recently that because of its history the final product
"could not.., be fairly called a 'restatement of anything."' Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the
Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV.
1232, 1237 (1997).
4. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
6. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
465 U.S. 770 (1984); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
7. For instance, it has been nearly twenty years since the Supreme Court's decision in
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), and the lower court decisions have
effectively modified the rules established there. See generally William L. Reynolds, The
Proper Forum for a Suit: Transnational Forum Non Conveniens and Counter-Suit Injunctions
in the Federal Courts,.70 TEX. L. REv. 1663 (1992).
8. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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and credit, it may be possible now to determine the deference that the forum state
owes to a sister-state injunction.' 0 Also it would be useful for the ALI to address an
increasingly serious problem-the effect of a judgment (especially a consent
judgment) on nonparties. The Supreme Court offered no valuable guidance in Baker
v. General Motors Corp.,' and the bench and bar would profit from the ALI's view.
Further, now that section 103's"2 potential for mischief is apparent,' 3 it may be the
right time to abandon it, with all due respect to its illustrious sponsor. 4 Finally, it may
be appropriate to include a more comprehensive treatment ofjudgment recognition
in the international context in light of the progress toward a comprehensive
recognition convention.
Three final areas that have seen enough development since 1971 to warrant
reconsideration in a third restatement are corporations, estate administration, and
especially family law.'" But to pose the issue of a third restatement of conflicts is not
to ask whether there are useful incremental improvements to be made to the sections
on jurisdiction, judgments, and family law. The real question that brings us here is
whether the time is right to overhaul the Second Restatement' s choice-of-law regime.
II. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT IN CAPSULE
Even the most aggressive surgeons (or pathologists) are willing to conduct a brief
examination of the patient (or body) before beginning work. Thus, before attempting
to cure or bury the Second Restatement, it makes sense to examine its provisions at
least briefly. The Second Restatement adopts a complex, layered approach to choice
of law that borrows from a wide array of traditional and modern methodologies. Like
its predecessor, it is comprehensive and detailed, containing hundreds of territorial
choice-of-law rules divided by subject matter (torts, contracts, property, etc.). It also
10. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
11. Id.
12. "A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or
enforced in a sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the national
policy of full faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with important
interests of the sister State." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 103.
13. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) (plurality opinion,
based in part on the rationale of section 103, that would cast doubt on the basic principles of
full faith and credit). For further discussion, see WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L.
REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAws 352-60 (2d ed. 1993).
14. See Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153, 176-77 (1949).
15. In several ofthese areas, athird restatement could clarify recent developments and lend
the authority of the American Law Institute to current solutions of difficult problems.
Corporate law, for example, would benefit from the Institute's guidance concerning the effect
of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), on state regulatory authority.
Probate and family law have been the targets of numerous uniform acts, and a restatement's
concise rendition of those statutes and the decisional law interpreting them would be most
useful. Finally, the third restatement could weigh in on the unresolved, although very
important, question of whether a court needs personal jurisdiction over both parents before it
can award custody to either. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 383-85.
2000]
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incorporates, however, much modem learning from the choice-of-law revolution
including the grouping-of-contacts technique, interest analysis, validation, and party
autonomy.
Holmes's famous aphorism that a page of history is worth a volume of logic applies
with special force to the Second Restatement. It is difficult to understand the
document and its hybrid method without some understanding of its eighteen-year
drafting history. The project began in 1953 as an attempt to respond to the withering
academic criticism of the First Restatement and to accommodate the beginnings of
a conflicts revolution that was occurring in the courts. It ended in 1971 as a complex,
negotiated settlement among several warring factions of choice-of-law
revolutionaries. As a descriptive "restatement," it was doomed to failure from the
outset because it is impossible to "restate" a revolution that is in progress and whose
outcome is in doubt. As a normative "pre-statement," it has proved to be a huge
success among the courts but an object of academic derision.
Repudiating the dogma of vested rights, the early drafts nevertheless retained the
First Restatement's strong territorial bias but broadened its scope. Thus they
contained a multitude of specific jurisdiction-selecting rules but also incorporated the
"center 6f gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach that had begun to appear in
progressive judicial opinions. Conspicuously absent, however, was any serious
attempt at policy analysis or consideration of the content of competing internal rules.
The predictable result of those omissions was scathing criticism from the academic
proponents of the more modem theories, particularly Albert Ehrenzweig. 6 The
response of the drafters and their leader, Willis Reese, was to attempt to co-opt the
critics by incorporating many of their ideas in the choice-of-law principles of section
6. 1' The result was the final 1971 draft, depending upon your point of view, either a
balanced and sophisticated amalgam or an incoherent mishmash. 8
Three basic elements define the choice-of-law approach ofthe SecondRestatement:
(a) section 6 and the most significant relationship," (b) a few grouping-of-contacts
sections, and (c) numerous sections that provide choice-of-law rules for specific legal
claims and issues.
The concept of the "most significant relationship" lies at the intellectual heart of
the Second Restatement. It appears in section after section, sometimes as a general
residual choice-of-law directive to be used when no specific section applies,2"
16. See, e.g., Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for
Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230 (1965); see also infra notes 72, 73.
17. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 6.
18. For more on the history of the drafting process, see Borchers, supra note 3, at 1235-40;
Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the
Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REV. 653,655-57 (1995); William L. Reynolds, Legal
Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. REV. 1371, 1390-91 (1997); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The
Vicissitudes of Choice ofLaw: The Restatement (First, Second) and InterestAnalysis, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 329, 357 (1997).
19. See supra notes 3, 7.
20. See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 145.
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sometimes as a check, such as a limit on party autonomy in contract, 21 and sometimes
as an escape device used to avoid the irrational result of a presumptive territorial
reference. 2
The Second Restatement contains no explicit definition of the concept of-"most
significant relationship." Nevertheless, the implication is clear that the state of the-
most significant relationship is the state whose law would be applied by a court
committed to the choice-of-law principles of section 6. In the absence of a choice-of-
law statute,' section 6(2) counsels a choice based on a series of factors that capture
many of the themes of the choice-of-law revolution:24
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection ofjustified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result,
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.'
The second major component of the Second Restatement' s choice-of-law program is
a host of specific sections treating a large number of specific issues via a wide variety
of choice-of-law strategies. By far, the largest number are territorial presumptions of
varying strength, most of which may be overcome by reference to section 6.26
21. See, e.g., id § 187.
22. See, e.g., id § 140 cmt. c.
23. Section 6(l) directs a court to follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of
law. Although the subsection is uncontroversial, its range of application is fairly narrow as
statutory directives on choice of law are quite rare. As comment c suggests, "legislatures
usually legislate... only with the local situation in mind." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note
1, § 6 cmt. c. There are, however, a few exceptions; the Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, contains choice-of-law provisions, as do many no-fault automobile accident
compensation statutes.
24. Although the list of factors first appeared in an article co-authored by the Reporter for
the Second Restatement, Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959, 962-81 (1952), it reveals a debt to Currie, Leflar, comparative
impairment and other true-conflict-resolution devices, and even the First Restatement. The
drafters deliberately chose to list the factors in no particular order of importance, and
acknowledged that "[v]arying weight will be given to a particular factor, or to a group of
factors, in different areas of choice of law." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 6 cmt. c.
25. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 6(2).
26. The strength of the presumption varies widely among the sections. In some cases, the
presumption is very strong indeed. Thus nearly all issues of procedure and evidence except for
limitations, burden of proof, and privilege are referred to the law of the forum with no "most
significant relationship" exception clause. See id. §§ 123-143. Similarly, and much more
controversially, the sections dealing with real property point absolutely to the law that would
be applied by the courts of the situs, see il §§ 223-235, and most of those dealing with the
succession on death of personal property refer, without an exception clause, to the law that
would be applied by the courts of decedent's domicile. See id. §§ 236-243. (Note that these
two sets of sections specifically call for application of the doctrine ofrenvoi and thus leave the
2000]
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
In addition to its territorial presumptive references, the Second Restatement also
uses other choice-of-law methodologies in several of its specific sections. Party
autonomy, for instance, figures importantly in the provisions governing consensual,
planned transactions.27 Substantivism-choosing law by the result that it produces-is
the basis for other sections, the clearest example being the validating provisions
affecting usurious contracts, powers of appointment wills, foreign incorporations, and
contract formalities." Finally, a few sections are purely interest-analytic. The best
examples are the sections on presumptions and burdens ofproduction and persuasion,
which refer to the law of the forum "unless the primary purpose of the relevant rule
of the state of the otherwise applicable law is to affect decision of the issue rather
than to regulate the conduct of the trial."29
The final component of the Second Restatement' s choice-of-law system is a set of
familiar grouping-of-contacts sections, most notably section 145 (torts) 0 and section
forum court with at least the possibility of escape from the law of the situs or the decedent's
domicile. The possibility of escape is not great, however, because these sections also contain
provisions suggesting that the courts of the situs or decedent's domicile will "usually apply
their own local law.")
The language of other sections reveals less confidence in the presumptive reference. Thus
for many types of tort claims, see id. §§ 146-156, and for many types of contracts, see id. §§
189-207, the Second Restatement refers to a particular territorial contact, "unless, with respect
to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6," id. §§ 189-197, to the claim and the parties. Sections treating particular contract
and tort issues are even more tentative, suggesting only that the supplied territorial reference
will "usually" control. Id. §§ 157-158.
Finally, some sections include no presumptive territorial reference at all, referring instead
to the appropriate general grouping-of-contacts section which, of course, incorporates by
reference the choice-of-law principles of section 6. For more thorough discussion of the
Restatement's territorial presumptions, see Shaman, supra note 18, at 357-64; Symeon C.
Symeonides, Exception Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 813 (Supp.
1994).
27. Thus, the drafters give the parties total control over the construction of wills, see
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 268; trusts, see id. §§ 269, 271, 272, 277; and
contracts, see id. § 187(1); and substantial control over the validity of contracts, see id. §
187(2); and inter vivos trusts of movables, see id. § 270. On the party autonomy provisions,
see Larry Kramer, Choice ofLaw in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments,
39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 480-86 (1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, "Tempora
Mutantur... "--Wills and Trusts in the Conflicts Restatement, 72 COLUM. L.REv. 382 (1972).
28. See, e.g., SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 139 (providing for the admission into
evidence of a communication if it is admissible according to the privilege law of either the
forum or the state which has the most significant relationship with the communication). On
substantivism as a choice-of-law strategy, see GENE R. SHREVE, A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
ANTHOLOGY 139-52 (1997).
29. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note I, §§ 133-134.
30. Id. § 145. That section states the following:
The General Principle
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties underthe principles
stated in §6.
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188 (contracts),3 ' that serve a residual function when an issue or a claim is nottreated
by a specific choice-of-law directive.?2
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the-place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Id.
3 1. Id. § 188. That section states:
Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles
stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties, the contacts to be
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law
applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are
in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied,
except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
Id.
32. The grouping-of-contacts sections are the lineal descendants of the "center of gravity"
opinions that appeared early in the choice-of-law revolution, especially in New York. That
approach, which dominated the early drafts of the Second Restatement, is vulnerable to two
fundamental criticisms. See Finch, supra note 18, at 687-90. First, like the hard-and-fast rules
of the First Restatement, the grouping-of-contacts approach is jurisdiction selecting; it does
not take into account the contents of the competing internal rules. Second, it offers no way of
measuring the significance of contacts, and, without a measure of significance, the center of
gravity system amounts to little more than contact counting. See Shaman, supra note 18, at
359-61.
Later drafts of the grouping-of-contacts sections provide a greater role for policy analysis.
Thus the final version of section 145 calls for application of the law of "the state which... has
the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated
in § 6." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 145(1). Correspondingly, the role of the
enumerated contacts is diminished; they are simply "to be taken into account in applying the
principles of § 6." Id. § 145(2). Comment e to section 145 demotes the contacts to mere
presumptions, thus making the relative importance of policy analysis and content enumeration
even more clear:
In applying the principles of § 6 to determine the state of most significant
relationship, the forum should give consideration to the relevant policies of all
2000]
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Consisting, as it does, of several disparate elements, the Second Restatement could
have used an owner's manual, but the drafters did not indicate explicitly how the
various elements should be coordinated. Probably they intended the following
decision procedure: In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law directive, a court
should turn first to a specific section that covers the issue or claim before it. Nearly
all of those, however, refer to section 6 (and perhaps to one of the grouping-of-
contacts sections, as well) to suggest possible avoidance or qualification of the black
letter. If no specific section covers the issue or claim before the court, the court
should refer to the general grouping-of-contacts sections, which also include a
reference' to section 6. Thus, whether it uses the specific sections or the general
grouping-of-contacts sections, eventually the court will need to apply the section 6(2)
factors."
Subsections 6(2)(b) and (c) clearly contemplate the court's performing some sort
of interest analysis. Presumably if that analysis indicates a false conflict, the court
should apply the law of the only interested state. If the case is a nonfalse conflict, the
court should use the factors of section 6(2)(d)-(g) to resolve the true conflict or
unprovided-for case. In no event, however, should the court use the grouping-of-
contacts sections to justify a center-of-gravity or contact-counting approach. The
contacts enumerated in the grouping-of-contacts sections have no independent
significance and are relevant only insofar as they implicate the factors of section
6(2). 3
Ill. WORK LEFT UNDONE
Perhaps the most impressive achievement of the Second Restatement has been its
contribution to the choice-of-law revolution. 3 1 Most of the states that have abandoned
the lex loci rules have opted for the Second Restatement, and it seems fair to conclude
that progress away from the traditional dysfunctional rules would have been much
slower without the Second Restatement. A sensible question, therefore, when
contemplating a third restatement, is whether there is work left undone from the
revolution. Reform of the situs ruleis the clearest example.
Although the SecondRestatement hastened the demise of most ofthe lex loci rules,
it left "one of most dysfunctional" of all,36 the situs rule, intact." The problem with
potentially interested states and the relevant interests of those states in the
decision of the particular issue. Those states which are most likely to be interested
are those which have one or more of the following contacts With the occurrence
and the parties.
Id. § 145 cmt. e.
33. Id. § 6(2).
34. In fact, of course, many of the courts that purport to "follow" the Second Restatement
perform no such analysis and in fact use a rough grouping-of-contacts approach. See infra text
accompanying notes 58-71.
35. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 1255; Russell J. Weintraub, "At Least, To Do No
Harm ": Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD.
L. REV. 1284, 1309-10 (1997).
36. Weintraub, supra note 35, at 1307.
37. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 223-224.
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the situs rule, demonstrated a generation ago by Professors Hancock38 and
Weintraub,39 is an imbalance between its scope and rationale. The scope of the rule
extends to nearly all questions involving title to real property, but its rationales work
in only a fraction of those cases. One argument for the rule is that only the situs courts
can directly affect land within the situs state; therefore every nonsitus court should
apply the law of the situs to insure that courts of the situs state will enforce the forum-
court's judgment. The argument fails to take account of the considerable power of a
nonsitus court with personal jurisdiction over the contestants for the land. Often such
a court will not need the good will of the situs to ensure enforcement. Further, the
argument does not apply at all when the forum court is the situs.
A second argument for the rule relies on recording systems. Title searching should
be made as simple as possible; the searcher should be able to examine conveyances
in the chain of title and determine their effect easily, an exercise that is feasible only
ifthe effect of such instruments is controlled by the law of the situs. Again, however,
many land cases involve parties that have not relied on the land reporting systems,
and, as long as the prevailing party properly records the interest conferred by the
judgment, the application of nonsitus law will not mislead future purchasers.
A final argument focuses on the strong interest that the situs state has in land within
its borders, but again, the rationale applies to only a small fraction of the relevant
cases. The situs, as situs, surely has the strongest interest in resolving issues of land
use, environmental protection, and alienability of title; but it is hard to see how the
situs state's interest in its land is implicated by disputes involving succession, marital
rights, or legitimacy, issues in which nonsitus states often will have vital interests.
In light of the long-familiar flaws in the arguments for the situs rule, the third
restatement has an immediate contribution to make by abandoning the rule. Having
attended the meetings of the ALI at which tentative restatement drafts are debated,
we offer the following proposed sections with the level of trepidation that we
otherwise reserve for bungee-jumping:
§ 223. The General Principle
(1) Except as provided in § 223A, the rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to an issue involving title to immovable
property are determined by the law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the property and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the applicable law include:
1. the situs of the immovable property,
38. See Moffatt Hancock, Conceptual DevicesforAvoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of
Laws: The Disadvantages ofDisingenuousness, 20 STAN. L. REV. I (1967); Moffatt Hancock,
Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Laws and Judgments in Real Property Litigation: The
Supreme Court and the Land Taboo, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1966).




(b) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties,
(c) the place where any relevant transaction involving the
immovable occurred.
These contracts are to be evaluated with regard to their relative
importance to the particular issue and the policies behind the
competing internal laws.
§ 223A. The Law of the Situs of the Immovable Property
Notwithstanding the principal of § 223, the rights and liabilities of
the parties with respect to an issue involving title to immovable
property are determined by the whole law of the situs of the
immovable if,
(1) Application of the law of a state other than the situs would
disadvantage a party that relied reasonably on the law of the situs
in conducting a title search or evaluating its results.
(2) Enforcement of the order of the court is likely to be impossible
unless the court applies the law of the situs.
In addition to these sections, more intrepid drafters should supply comments
indicating that the reason for the two sections is the limited application of the
arguments in defense of the situs rule. Also useful would be examples of situations
in which each section would apply. Another possible addition would be several
specific sections devoted to issues for which territorial references or other specific
choice-of-law directives would be useful. What comes to mind immediately are
sections dealing with succession on death that presumably would mirror the current
provisions for succession on death to movable property, thus preserving the policy
of uniformity that animates the place-of-decedent's-domicile rule.
IV. THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP
A. Empirical Studies
There is other work for a third restatement that is not left over from the choice-of-
law revolution. That revolution owed a substantial debt to the academy, the work of
two generations of choice-of-law theorists, who demonstrated the dysfunctional
nature of most of the First Restatement rules. But after sixty years, the theoretical
debates are reaching the point of diminishing returns. As Professor Westbrook
remarked in 1975, if six or seven centuries of debate among the statutists did not
solve the unilateralist/multilateralist debate, differences of opinion on such
fundamental questions are not likely to disappear.40 Further the contemporary version
40. See James E. Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing Choice-of-Law
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of that debate seems mannered and cloistered; we interpret and reinterpret the same
sacred texts and write about the same few cases even though nearly a thousand
choice-of-law cases are decided every year.41 The theoretical scholarship, while
adequate to demonstrate the faults of the First Restatement, does not seem to be able
to produce consensus on the proper modem approach. The reason is that like the
metaphysical discussions criticized by the Logical Positivists, it is directed toward
questions that can only be debated, not resolved.
Lately, however, a new type of scholarship has begun to emerge. Unlike the
theoretical work, it is inductive, rather than deductive. The former begins with basic
postulates about the fundamental questions of choice of law: multilateralism versus
unilateralism, the nature of sovereignty, the need for comity, and the teleological
nature of law. It then deduces consequences for practical choice-of-law problems.
This new work proceeds inductively instead. It reasons from multiple results in actual
cases toward choice-of-law rules of thumb that courts actually follow. This style of
reasoning is not unknown in the law. It is essentially the program of the Realists, who
were concerned with what courts do, rather than what they say. Further, it has a place
in the history of choice of law; Robert Leflar adopted such a strategy to produce his
"choice influencing considerations,"42 and Albert Ehrenzweig used it to search for
"true rules."
43
To see the difference in the two approaches, consider the problem of party
autonomy. For Beale it was forbidden since it involved an act of sovereign power
performed by private parties. Currie, a staunch positivist, largely ignored the problem
as irrelevant to his concerns with achieving rational solutions based upon the states'
policy goals. The new scholarship simply takes party autonomy for granted because
it is accepted by nearly all domestic and foreign courts; it then seeks to determine
how prevalent the practice is, how willing the courts are to enforce choice-of-law
clauses in different types of transactions, and how often they are willing to override
the clause for public policy reasons.
The new studies take two principal forms. The first form to appear consisted of
descriptive studies of large bodies of cases. This work differs from the more
traditional writing primarily in its focus on large numbers of cases instead of
particular results from well-known courts. Here the leaders have been Phaedon
Kozyris and Symeon Symeonides, who for years have surveyed the annual choice-of-
law decisions of American courts.' More promising yet, is a new form of study,
Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L. REV. 407, 446-47 (1975). The 25 years
since Westbrook's prediction have validated it; the debate between interest analysts (such as
Sedler and Posnak) and their critics (Juenger and Brilmayer) remains alive and well.
41. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 1384.
42. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Robert Leflar, Judicial Process, and
Choice of Law, 52 ARK. L. REV. 123, 134-36 (1999).
43. See infra discussion accompanying notes 72-73.
44. See, e.g., Phaedon J. Kozyris, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1987: An
Overview, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 547 (1988); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1998: TwelfthAnnualSurvey, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 327 (1999). Other useful
surveys have been produced by Herma Hill Kay, Theory Into Practice: Choice of Law in the
Courts, 34 MERCERL. REV. 521 (1983); Kramer, supra note 27; William M. Richman & David
Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its
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introduced independently by Pat Borchers and Mike Solimine, involving statistical
analysis of choice-of-law decisions. The sequence here is reminiscent of progress in
the history of science. At first scientists speculated about the phenomena, then
conducted limited observations of relatively few instances, then multiplied and
systematized their observations, and finally began to test hypotheses statistically.45
The corresponding progressive increase in predictive power is why today in most
inquiries we prefer anecdotal evidence to speculation and consider empirical evidence
the best of the three.
B. Preliminary Findings
Thus far there have been relatively few studies, but the results already show the
potential to solve persistent choice-of-law problems or at least radically alter the
terms of their debate.
1. Eclecticism
One of the clearest examples of the ability of the new research to alter the course
of a long-standing choice-of-law dispute involves the debate on eclecticism. One
effect of the choice-of-law revolution was the multiplication of choice-of-law
methodologies to the extent that six or seven modem methods were adopted by the
several states, and some courts, embarrassed at the riches, seemed to vacillate among
the new methods. Defending eclecticism, Professor Leflar remarked that in most
cases the modem methods "would all ordinarily lead to the same conclusion as to
who should win the case."4 Professor Reppy challenged that assertion by
demonstrating analytically that the modem methods in fact can produce different
results in particular hypothetical cases.47 And so the matter stood, another of many
choice-law disputes that could be debated, but never resolved.
More recently, two independent statistical studies carried out by Dean Borchers and
Professor Solimine take the debate to a new and more informed level. The studies
compared the actual performance in tort cases of courts professing several different
modem methods. On three crucial variables-the frequency with which decisions
were pro-forum law, pro-recovery, and pro-forum resident-both reported that the
records of the modernist courts were statistically indistinguishable regardless of the
differences in their methodological allegiances." It may be that the empirical studies
Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196 (1997):
Gregory E. Smith. Choice of Law in the United States. 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1041 (1987); and
Michael E. Solimine. An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV.
49(1989).
45. The final step in science, experimentation by manipulating variables, may be hard to
accomplish in choice of law.
46. Robert A. Leflar, Choice ofLaw: A Well-Watered Plateau, LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1977, at 10, 11.
47. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or
Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 650-51 (1983).
48. See PatrickJ. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Solimine, supra note 44.
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do not resolve the eclecticism debate completely. After all, statistical identity of
results does not mean that every concern of the anti-eclectics is allayed, but the
debate certainly is advanced by the results of the studies in a way that no theoretical
analysis could.
2. Choice-of-Law Methodology
The Borchers and Solimine studies,49 along with several others, also change the
terms of the persistent debate on choice-of-law methodology. After all, why continue
to debate the relative merits of competing modem theories if all produce the same
pattern and frequency of results? In the words of the leading observer of American
choice-of-law decisions, "the reality of the case law cannot be ignored. That reality
suggests that methodology plays a relatively minor role in explaining the results in
actual cases."5 Further, the statistical studies also show that the result patterns of
First Restatement courts differ significantly from those of modernist courts, thus
suggesting that any left-over energy for theoretical debate is better directed toward
convincing recalcitrant courts to abandon the lex loci rules than to debating the
relative merits of the competing modem systems.
Also significant for the issue of methodology are the results of a series of case
surveys conducted by Deans Symeonides and Borchers, and Professors Solimine,
Kramer, and Richman. All demonstrate that the Second Restatement is the dominant
choice-of-law system among the state and federal courts.5 The majority of courts that
have abandoned the lex loci rules have opted for the Second Restatement, and the
trend continues to accelerate. We can continue to debate the relative merits of the
Second Restatement2 and its competitors, but the courts seem to have made their
decision.
A final methodological issue illuminated by the new wave of empirical research is
the question ofrules versus approach, considered by some to be the central choice-of-
law problem today.3 The victory of the Second Restatement over other less rule-
oriented systems might suggest that the courts have opted for the certainty and
security of rules over the flexibility offered by an approach.54 After all, the
49. See Borchers, supra note 48; Solimine, supra note 44.
50. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 1263; see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance
of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1994) ("[T]he result in the case often
appears to have dictated the judges choice of law approach at least as much as the approach
itself generated the result.").
51. See, e.g., Richman & Riley, supra note 44; Symeonides, supra note 44; Symeonides,
supra note 2.
52. The Maryland Law Review contains the most recent set of evaluations of the Second
Restatement. See Symposium, The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts Restatement, 57
MD. L. REV. 1193-1411 (1997) (articles by Richman and Riley, Borchers, Symeonides,
Weintraub, Weinberg, and Reynolds).
53. See, e.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV.
315 (1972).
54. The most well-known attempts at rule formulation are the Neumeier rules of the Court
of Appeals of New York, the Louisiana Codification, and the ALl Complex Litigation Rules.
The most "unruly" systems today seem to be the lex fori approaches ofNevada, Michigan, and
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Restatement goes beyond the mere provision of hundreds of rules and seems to rank
them according to how much is needed to overcome the rule's presumption. The
recent empirical studies, however, disprove the rules-are-favored hypothesis."5 In fact,
Dean Borchers's comparative citation study and Dean Symeonides's observations
show that in tort and contract cases Second Restatement courts tend to rely primarily
upon the general sections of the SecondRestatement (sections 6, 145, 188) and ignore
the vast majority of the territorial presumptions, even when one is precisely on
point.16 This counterintuitive result is the sort that comes only through the reading or
systematic study of hundreds of decisions. It would be foolhardy to undertake a new
restatement in ignorance of so significant a finding. 7
3. Abuse of the Second Restatement
Although some courts correctly interpret and faithfully follow the Second
Restatement's complex, layered choice-of-law provisions, 8 a fairly consistent finding
of the empirical studies is that others misinterpret and abuse the most significant
relationship device. Examination of the choice-of-law principles of section 6(2)"'
shows that the Second Restatement's drafters intended the most significant
relationship device to amalgamate much of the learning that inspired the choice-of-
law revolution. In particular, the debt to interest analysis (including the various true-
conflict-resolution devices), Leflar, the new territorialists, and the center-of-gravity
theory are most apparent. Nevertheless many SecondRestatement courts use sections
6,61 1 4 5 ,6' and 18862 to perform a much cruder choice-of-law analysis, similar to the
grouping-of-contacts approach.
An especially egregious example is Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Black.63
The plaintiffs and the defendant, all Ohio residents, drove in the defendant's car to
Ontario, where the defendant's negligence caused a collision with an Ontario driver.
When the plaintiffs sought recovery in Ohio for their personal injuries, the courts
faced a choice between the Ontario no-fault statute, which prohibited plaintiff's claim
against the defendant and Ohio law, which did not. The Ohio appellate court began
Kentucky. On the excesses of the latter, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1996: The Tenth Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447, 448-51, 457
(1997) (discussing Nevada and Michigan); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 240-49 (1998) (discussing Michigan and
Kentucky).
55. See. e.g., Borchers, supra note 48; Solimine, supra note 44.
56. See Borchers, supra note 3.
57. That may explain in part the ALI's unfortunate decision in the Complex Litigation
Project to opt for territorial rules, which have met with virtually complete rejection.
58. See, e.g., Esser v. Mcintyre, 661 N.E.2d 1138 (III. 1996) (demonstrating a correct
policy-sensitive decision of false-conflict personal injury case; where the injury occurred in
Mexico and the parties were domiciled in Illinois).
59. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note I, § 6(2).
60. Id. § 6.
61. Id. § 145.
62. Id. § 188.
63. 656 N.E.2d 1352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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its analysis, as instructed by the Ohio Supreme Court, with section 146 of the Second
Restatement and quoted the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Restatement's
method for applying that presumption.'
Pursuant to this section, a presumption is created that the law of the place of the
injury controls unless another jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to
the lawsuit. To determine the state with the most significant relationship, a court
must then proceed to consider the general principles set forth in Section 145. The
factors within this section are: (1) the place of the injury; (2) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the domicil, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; (4) the place where the
relationship between the parties, if any, is located; and (5) any factors under
Section 6 which the court may deem relevant to the litigation. All of these factors
are to be evaluated according to their relative importance to the case.6"
The court allowed that the Second Restatement emphasizes the parties' common
domicile but rejected that choice because not all parties were Ohioans. (At this point
the battle was between the parties' insurers, only one of which was an Ohio
corporation.') It cited the section 145 factors (the negligent conduct and the resultant
injury) that favored Ontario and rejected the plaintiff's argument that the place of
injury was merely fortuitous. It severely limited the "fortuitous" exception to the
place-of-injury rule by relying on an unfortunate passage from the comments to
section 145.67 The comment suggests that the place of injury would be "fortuitous,"
for example, when an airplane traveling between two points in State X flies briefly
over the territory of State Y where the pilot's negligence causes injury to a
passenger.6" "Unlike the example," said the court, "there is no evidence in the record
that the [parties] momentarily strayed into Ontario, en route between two distinct
points in Ohio, when the injuries occurred." '69
In spite of that unfortunate language, the court still would have got it right had it
performed the section 6 analysis; no such luck, for it completely misinterpreted the
import of section 6.
Although [the Supreme Court of Ohio's interpretation of the Restatement] permits
a court to consider, as a fifth factor, those considerations set forth in Section 6 of
the Restatement that it deems relevant, those considerations largely require a
weighing of the various policy interests involved. In the case subjudice, Ontario
could likely advance as many policy reasons for its no-fault insurance law as Ohio
could for its fault-based system. Essentially, these considerations offset one
another.7"
64. See id at 1355.
65. Id. (footnote omitted).
66. See id at 1355-56.
67. Id. at 1356.
68. Id.
69. Id at 1357. Professor Weintraub has cited the potential for mischief of this ill-chosen
example. See Weintraub, supra note 35, at 1289.
70. Black, 656 N.E.2d at 1357.
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Very likely, Professor Kramer had read a few too many Black-style opinions,
grossly mishandling simple false conflict cases, when he remarked that "one needs
to read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to appreciate just how badly the
Second Restatement works in practice.' In any event, the newer studies have
revealed the disturbing frequency of decisions that misread the Second Restatement,
and the drafters of its successor would be foolish to proceed on the now-disproved
assumption that the sophisticated dialectical process contemplated by section 6 is the
one that all (or even most?) Second Restatement courts actually apply.
4. New Evidence of "True Rules"'72
As part of his Legal Realist agenda, Professor Albert Ehrenzweig coined this term
to refer to a set of rules or generalizations that in fact predict the decisions of courts
in choice-of-law cases. Unlike the lex loci rules, which were deduced a priori from
the vested rights theory, these rules would be induced or abstracted from the
tendencies of courts to reach certain choice-of-law results regardless of their
announced methodology. Among the most prominent, he found, were the rule of
validation (for marriages and most contracts), the rule permitting the parties to choose
the law to govern their contract, and the situs rule for many issues involving
immovables.73
The possibility, however, of finding and, more importantly, agreeing on "true
rules" is relatively low absent the ability to survey and tabulate the results of large
numbers of decisions. Here the new scholarship is especially valuable for its ability
to find and document persistent choice-of-law practices that otherwise might have
received little attention. Thus, Dean Borchers's citation study, while noting a
widespread tendency among the courts to ignore most of the Second Restatement's
specific provisions, nevertheless found that some sections receive disproportionate
attention in the reported decisions.74
Some come as no surprise; even a casual reader of conflicts cases would note that
section 18771 (party autonomy in contracts) has been extremely popular among the
courts. Similarly, section 20376 (validation in usury cases) is one ofthe usual suspects
for inclusion on the "true rules" list. But there are some surprises as well. Casual
observers might have been unaware of the success of section 1497 (single state
defamation), section 15078 (multi-state defamation), sections 192"9 and 19380 (life and
71. Kramer, supra note 27, at 486-87.
72. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A "Restatement" ofthe "Lex
Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340 (1965).
73. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 41-42 (3d ed. 1974);
Ehrenzweig, supra note 72, at 340.
74. See Borchers, supra note 3, at 1242-46.
75. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 187.
76. See id. § 203.
77. See id. § 149.
78. See id. § 150.
79. See id. § 192.
80. See id. § 193.
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casualty insurance), and section 196"' (contracts forthe rendition ofservices), 2 Some
of these rules are so successful as to transcend the Second Restatement itself; thus
sections 187, 193, and 203 have garnered widespread approval among courts that
otherwise remain in the thrall of the lex loci rules.8 3 What to make ofthese"true rules"
is a separate normative question. Should they be guaranteed a spot in a third
restatement, or not? A purely descriptive study, of course, can never answer such a
question. Regardless of the answer, however, drafters of a future restatement should
at least know of the existence of all colorable candidates for "true rule" status.
C. Implications for the Third Restatement
What does the new scholarship portend for the timing and content of a third
restatement? Certainly it has produced results that the drafters of such a document
would be foolish to ignore. One strategy would be to consider the lessons learned and
attempt to tailor the Second Restatement in light of them. Thus, a third restatement
might include much more explicit commentary on how the most significant
relationship inquiry should be conducted. The comments might steer courts more
toward the policy-centered approach originally intended by the drafters of section 6
and away from the scattershot center-of-gravity approach used in cases like Black.s4
Another possibility would be to eliminate many of the territorial presumptions that
generated so much academic criticism during the drafting of the SecondRestatement.
The actual practice of contemporary SecondRestatement courts suggests that they are
useless anyway. A final possibility would be to highlight the few specific sections
81.See id. § 196.
82. Borchers's citation study shows a few other sections that receive disproportionate
numbers of citations, but they do not evidence true rules in the same sense as the cited
examples. See Borchers, supra note 3, at 1242-46. Several do not contain rules at all, but are
simply grouping-of-contacts sections for particular types of claims. See, e.g., SECOND
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 148 (fraud and misrepresentation); id. § 175 (wrongful death).
Others simply direct the court to sections 6 and 145 or 188. See id. § 171 (measure of damages
for torts), id. § 207 (measure of damages for contracts).
Borchers did not include the sections on property or procedure in the citation study, but a
preliminary tabulation shows that a few of those sections also are cited disproportionately. See
Borchers, supra note 3, at 1242-44; SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 142, 143 (statute
of limitations; pre- and post-1988 revision versions both cited more than all other procedure
sections); id. § 132 (property exempt from execution; no kidding); id. § 136 (notice and proof
of foreign law); id. § 139 (evidentiary privilege). Very likely some component of citation
frequency is simply a function of the difficulty of the issue or the frequency with which it
comes up, but some of the frequently cited sections such as 142 and 139, may contain true
rules. If section 139 turns out to be one, that would be an interesting result since it is a
substantivist rule (choose the law of the state that would not privilege the evidence), and its
substantive preference is consistent with the trend in evidence law to construe privileges
narrowly.
83. See Richman & Riley, supra note 44, at 1210, 1213-16, 1224 n.193 (noting a tendency
of many First Restatement courts to ignore the lex loci in order to enforce choice-of-law
clauses, validate contracts against the defense of usury, and apply the law of the place where
the parties expected the risk to be in life and casualty insurance cases).
84. 656 N.E.2d 1352 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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that have garnered nearly universal approval from Second Restatement adherents as
well as other modem and traditionalist courts. Such an empirically tailored third
restatement would incorporate the results of the conflicts revolution and also the
practical insights gained from thirty years of decisions applying the Second
Restatement. At least in terms of its ability to predict the courts' actual behavior, it
would be a significant improvement.
Nevertheless it would also be shortsighted to begin drafting now. We have
relatively few of the new empirical studies, yet they show the possibility for
transforming the debate on many of the classically unresolvable choice-of-law
conundrums. If a few such studies can have such remarkable implications, what
would be the result of a sustained period of empirical studies by a multitude of
choice-of-law scholars? That possibility suggests an answer to the question of the
timing of a third restatement. It is time to start working on the project, but not yet
time to start producing tentative drafts.
First the ALl or the Conflicts Section of the AALS should form a study group to
undertake a series of empirical studies over a sustained period-say, four or five
years-to formulate and test a series of hypotheses that have the potential to alter the
dialogue as much as the few existing studies have done already. This work is ideally
suited to the Section. While judges and lawyers have made and continue to make
important theoretical contributions to the development of choice of law, few have the
time, training, or resources to conduct systematic empirical research. If the section
could accomplish that descriptive task, the ALI would be in a position to begin
drafting an empirically based third restatement. The goal should be the one that
conflicts realists set at the beginning of the choice-of-law revolution-a set of
prescriptions that seeks to guide rather than compel the courts' decisions and that
allows the courts to produce honest opinions. These in turn would help the lower
courts and the bar make informed predictions, and provide a principled and
sustainable solution to the anarchy that has followed the conflicts revolution.
V. SOME HYPOTHESES WORTH INVESTIGATION
Such a program, of course, would require a set of hypotheses worth testing by
empirical study. While others are probably better situated to suggest candidates," I
offer these simply in hopes of getting the ball rolling:
1. Party Autonomy: With what frequency do courts uphold choice-of-law and forum-
selection clauses? Does the frequency of validation of choice-of-law clauses depend
upon whether the clause selects forum or foreign law? What about when the clause
opts for the law of a foreign country? Is the tendency to uphold forum-selection and
choice-of-law clauses the same in consumer transactions as in transactions between
more sophisticated parties? Are there predictable patterns that prompt the courts to
invalidate these clauses on "public policy" grounds?
85. The usual suspects (whom we may be able to round up) would be Symeon Symeonides
because of his familiarity with decisional tendencies over the last decade, and Pat Borchers
because he seems to have a grasp of statistical research methods that far exceeds our own.
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2. Substantivism: Are there particular results that courts seek regardless of their
announced choice-of-law methodology? Can they be predicted by the standard
markers of "better law" (e.g., non-obsolescence, harmony with basic policies
underlying the general area of law, adherence of a majority of courts, approval of the
scholars in the substantive area)?
3. Rules- Versus-Approach Dichotomy: Much of the contemporary debate on choice-
of-law methodology centers on the rules-versus-approach dichotomy. Three recent
rulish formulations deserve study:
a. Dean Symeonides suggests that consensus among courts and scholars could be
reached on at least a few tort choice-of-law rules:
(i) apply the law of the parties common domicile in loss-distribution conflicts; (ii)
apply the law of the place where both the conduct and injury have occurred in
conduct-regulation conflicts; and (iii) allow punitive damages if such damages are
imposed by the law of any two of the following places: the place of conduct, place
of injury, or the defendant's domicile. Consensus among the scholars may be beyond
hope, but we could test whether these rules please the courts. 6
b. Professor Kramer has suggested a series of canons of construction for true conflicts
that could also be tested for their ability to predict judicial behavior:
(i) if there is a conflict between two states' laws and failure to apply one would render
it practically ineffective, that law should be applied; (ii) in a conflict between a
substantive policy and a procedural policy, the law reflecting the substantive policy
should prevail (unless the forum's procedural interest is so strong that it should
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds); (iii) for contracts without a choice-of-law
clause, true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law that validates the
contract; (iv) where one of two conflicting laws is obsolete, the other should be
applied; and (v) where two laws conflict, but the parties actually and reasonably
relied on one of them, that law should be applied."
c. At least three rule-oriented regimes have generated some support outside the
scholarly community: What is the predictive capacity of the rules of the Louisiana
Codification, the ALI's Complex Litigation Project, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals of New York in Neumeier v. Kuehner?8
86. See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L.J. 437 (2000).
87. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990).
88. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972).
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